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Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are capital flows that are invested by companies abroad into 
the domestic economy. FDI is deemed to be an important source of capital for the less developed 
countries as direct investment implies there exists trust in the country’s business climate that 
supports said business’s long-term activity that is conducted there. Also, FDI flows are not easily 
hampered by temporal problems that a country might face since a company that has already 
invested itself somewhere is not inclined to change its location. However, on the flip side is that this 
kind of investment requires commitment from the multinational companies which forms a 
threshold for entry. 
The will to lower this threshold has been considerable, and it has stimulated efforts for 
understanding FDI. After the start of the 80s, when many developing nations had a hard time 
accessing credit from abroad due to over-borrowing in the 70s, interest towards the determinants 
of FDI grew (Chakrabarti, 2001). Supposedly, this research has provided policy recommendations 
for attracting foreign money. A part of this research has focused on political risk and governance 
such as the paper of Alesina and Tabellini in 1989, “External debt, capital flight and political risk”. 
All in all, while not the most prominent in the field of economic study, the FDI research has been a 
reasonably notable topic in the research of development economics. The major influences of this 
paper are the research of Chakrabarti (2001) and Busse and Hefeker (2005). 
The determinants of FDI are still topical issues as is FDI’s linkage to the political risk. There have 
been several countries that have distanced themselves from the rules-based order and leaned closer 
to authoritarianism. Most of these countries are not the most developed economies nor the least 
but somewhere in-between. It is interesting to see whether their FDI flows are affected by a change 
in political risks. 
Turkey is one of the countries that can be currently described as authoritarian (Esen and Gumuscu, 
2015). Turkey has not been that way for long though, as there have been more signs of pluralism in 
the 90s and the early 2000s than in recent years. For example, Turkey applied for membership of 
the European Union in 1987. The criteria of the EU membership can be boiled down to a competitive 
market economy and functioning liberal democratic system, and in the pursuit of the membership, 
Turkey needed to upgrade both of these fields. The accession eventually advanced and the actual 
negotiations for the membership started in 2005. Since then the negotiations have eventually 
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stalled. There has also been a shift in power from the parliament to the president after the failed 
coup attempt in 2016 (Butler et al. 2017) and many journalists have been jailed (Aldemir et al. 2018). 
One could argue that political risks have risen in Turkey. In this paper I want to examine the 
relationship this progress has to FDI.  
Against this background of FDI study and Turkey’s authoritarian development, the research 
questions of this paper are as follows: Firstly, how does political risk, as measured with a variety of 
indexes, affect or correlate with foreign direct investment? Secondly, do we see this relationship in 
Turkey during 1996-2017 using available data and time series regression and with what magnitude? 
The study is organized as follows. In Section 2, the earlier literature concerning FDI and political risk 
is covered while in Section 3 the data and variables are examined. In Section 4 there are a description 
of the model selection, the regression results, and the details on the diagnostics checks followed by 
the interpretation of the results. Lastly, Section 5 concludes this piece of research. 
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2 Literature Review 
When it comes to the scientific literature addressing the research questions, this survey can be 
divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the 2001 study of Chakrabarti that examines the 
determinants of FDI. The second part deals with the political risk and its estimation in various 
economic research papers. These two parts are more related to the first research question while 
the third part is more about covering the means to solve the second question. The third part depicts 
the paper of Busse and Hefeker (2005). They studied the relationship that political risks have with 
FDI, but they did so with a dataset of 83 developing nations, whereas this paper aims to look at the 
specifics of one country, Turkey. Nevertheless, their study offers a framework that can be imitated 
to a degree. 
Studies referred to in this section are mostly from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. FDI and its flows 
were studied extensively during this period, likely because of the economic liberalization ongoing in 
many countries during those years. 
2.1 FDI and its determinants, findings of Chakrabarti, 2001 
Chakrabarti (2001) conducted a meta-analysis on previous research on the possible determinants 
of FDI. It is the first attempt at this and it utilizes a form of cross-country model. Chakrabarti used a 
variant of Extreme Bound Analysis to figure out whether the variables chosen in the earlier studies 
can stand up to little tweaks in the information set. He found out that all tested variables except 
GDP per capita were sensitive to small changes. He also showed that openness to trade is likely to 
correlate with FDI. This study is beneficial since answering the research questions stated above 
requires control variables and this sheds light on which variables are useful and which are not. Also, 
Chakrabarti collected a set of earlier research regarding the topic which also contributes towards 
this research paper. 
According to Chakrabarti (2001) the literature addressing FDI flows states that many variables are 
affecting it. What is more, much of the literature provide even conflicting information. Some of the 
contradictory information can be explained with a great variety of empirical methods that were 
utilized. Also, the theoretical background of FDI is lacking as quite often in the earlier literature 
variables’ influence on FDI is not based on any theoretical explanation. This is at least the case when 
considering the cross-country regressions on FDI. 
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There seems to be consensus on some of the variables, however. The size of a market in per capita 
terms has a clear positive effect on FDI among all the literature Chakrabarti (2001) surveyed. The 
level of taxation seems to have adverse linkage to FDI according to most of the literature, though 
some deem connections insignificant and one paper found a positive association. There is no 
consensus among researchers whatsoever when it comes to the effects of labor costs on FDI. The 
exchange rate has either a negative or insignificant association with FDI and both growth rate and 
openness to trade seem to have either a positive or insignificant relation to FDI according to 
previous findings. The latter two variables and country’s market size are deemed quite important 
later as Busse and Hefeker (2005) used them as control variables in their regressions. 
Chakrabarti (2001) uses a version of Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) first used by Leamer (1983, 
1985). EBA effectively tests the strength of variables’ coefficients to changes in data. Chakrabarti’s 
EBA model was: 
Y = α + βX + γI + δZ + ε, 
in which Y represents net FDI in a study, α is an intercept term, X stands for a variable that earlier 
literature deems reliable (some indicator of the market size, in fact), I is the variable that is to be 
studied in each EBA, and Zs are the more controversial variables used earlier. As stated earlier, 
Chakrabarti (2001) finds out that GDP is a major determinant of FDI, regardless of whether it is 
reported as the absolute size of the economy or in per-capita terms. 
The I variables were not as clear cut. The I variables were wages, openness to trade, real exchange 
rates, tariffs, trade balance, the growth rate of the real GDP, and tax rate; effectively those variables 
that were under inspection among earlier studies. Chakrabarti (2001) discussed these inconclusive 
variables and states that often one would find a significant statistical relationship with FDI when one 
selectively chooses other explanatory variables. These variables could be determinants of FDI, 
though, but one should be cautious when thinking about using these. 
The exchange rate provides a possible determinant of FDI that will be looked at later in this piece of 
research. Turkish lira has been depreciating with respect to US dollar roughly since 2011. Many 
scholars have inspected the relationship between exchange rates and FDI such as Froot and Stein 
(1991) as well as Blonigen and Feenstra (1996) and find it significant and negative. This is contested 
however since Edwards (1990) argues that the effect of the exchange rate to FDI is positive and 
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significant. There are theories on how exchange rates affect investment. One of them stresses that 
the relative wealth increases with the appreciating currency, thus attracting more investment from 
abroad. 
2.2 Studies on Political Risk 
The term “political risk” is quite general in its possible meanings and does not have any universal 
definition. It becomes apparent when going through the research that deals with related concepts. 
This highlights the need to define this topic well. Also, Busse and Hefeker (2005) note that not much 
research has been done on political risk and its effects on FDI. 
However, there have been studies on political risk and similar concepts. The study of Brunetti and 
Weder (1998) was not about political risk but more broadly about institutional uncertainty and its 
relationship with investment in general. Wei (2000) studied the effects of corruption on FDI and 
found out that high levels of corruption scare away foreign direct investment. Busse (2004) 
researched whether or not multinational corporations prefer to operate in undemocratic countries. 
Turns out, they do not. Also, Jensen (2003) researched how democratic accountability affects FDI 
and found out that multinationals prefer to invest in democratic countries rather than authoritarian 
ones. The research of Krifa-Schneider and Matei (2010), a panel study, concentrated on business 
climate and political risk.  These all studies deal with the sort of political risk and the variables these 
pieces of research use are similar to the ones this paper examines.  
Some research papers treat political risk as more like “future policy risk”. Alesina and Tabellini (1989) 
studied what kind of government coalitions choose policies that increase investment risk. Varying 
definitions can confuse. As terms like “institutional risk” or “geopolitical risk” are often effectively 
the same as the political risk like it is defined in this study, it is apparent that the aim of the 
researchers is broadly the same. The idea is to examine the structures of the economy to describe 
phenomena and give policymakers recommendations. 
Often FDI and other investment studies employ panel or cross-section regressions as their methods. 
When political risk is studied, it is plugged into the specification as the variable of interest. For 
example, a panel analysis was utilized by Brunetti and Weder (1998). Their data sample contained 
60 countries and the time period was 1974–1989. The specification of Brunetti and Weder was 
modeled after studies that concentrate on growth and investment. It was the following model: 
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Invest = α0 + α1 GDPbase + α2 Secbase + α3 Govaver + α4 Tradaver + α 5 Inst + ε. 
The dependent variable Invest was the average rate of investment in their study period while 
GDPbase referred to real market size in per capita terms. Secbase is an interesting choice since it 
was enrolment ratio into secondary education which they used to measure human capital in a given 
year. Govaver stood for government expenditure as a ratio of GDP, and Tradaver, was the sum of 
exports and imports as a share of market size, indicating openness to trade. Govaver was the only 
variable expected to have a negative relationship with investment. Lastly, Inst was the variable of 
interest, institutional uncertainty which covers many issues such as government instability and 
policy uncertainty. The model is not the same as the ones utilized in this study below, yet it bears 
some resemblance. Brunetti and Weder's study concluded that factors such as disregard for the rule 
of law, a high degree of corruption and a great volatility in the exchange rate of country’s currency 
have the most adverse association with investment while there were other variables associated as 
well such as violent social change. 
Busse (2004) employed similar methods as Brunetti and Weder (1998) when trying to answer 
whether undemocratic countries attract more FDI than democratic ones. His model explaining FDI 
included real market size, growth rate of the economy, and trade openness as control variables. The 
variable of interest was a democracy variable that was composed of the indexes of Freedom House, 
the Political Rights index and the Civil Liberties index. His panel study had dataset in which there 
were 69 countries covering years from 1972 to 2001 
While panel studies appear to be most common, there have also been studies other kinds of 
empirical studies on political risk. Some studies focus on bilateral FDI flows that utilize a gravity 
model. Frenkel et al. (2004) did one such study focusing on emerging economies hosting 
investments from the five largest developed economies at the time. They included characteristics 
of the investing country as push factors and features of the host country as pull factors. Political risk, 
or lack thereof, was essentially a pull factor.  
2.3 The Paper of Busse and Hefeker, 2005 
Busse and Hefeker had a very similar research topic but their data addressed multiple economies. 
They tried to estimate the impact of political risks on FDI flows of 83 developing countries during 
the years 1984-2003. They used 12 different variables for political risks and found out that some 
indicators were better than others. These results were obtained by employing two different 
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empirical methods on panel analysis. The first one was a country fixed-effects model and the other 
included the Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
The variables Busse and Hefeker chose to represent political risk were provided by the Political Risk 
Services Group to International Country Risk Guide from which the data were collected. The twelve 
indicators were for government stability, socio-economic pressures, investment profile of a country, 
internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military influence on government, religious tensions, 
law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and quality of bureaucracy. These 
variables were given a value on a scale from 0 to 12 so that higher values represented less risk. Busse 
and Hefeker note that these indicators not only encompass political risk but also describe the 
strength of a country’s institutions. Some of them are also related to each other and Busse and 
Hefeker provide a correlation matrix for the variable correlation. 
Busse and Hefeker proceeded to build a model as a cross-country regression analysis with FDI net 
inflows per capita in US dollars as a dependent variable (FDI). They used averages of the years 1984-
2003 for this benchmark regression. In the regression, they had four control variables they believed 
to be major determinants in changes in FDI: Gross National Income (GNI), the real growth rate of 
GNI (GROWTH), openness to trade (TRADE) and the GDP deflator (INFLATION). Some of these 
control variables are likely to have an endogeneity problem, a fact that does not escape Busse and 
Hefeker as they later move on to a model that is estimated with a GMM. As discussed above, along 
with market size, growth rate and openness to trade were chosen as control variables as earlier 
research paints them as likeliest ones to be major determinants. 
The GDP deflator was also chosen to stand for inflation. Busse and Hefeker saw a low inflation rate 
as an indicator of a sound economic policy and thus use it as a proxy. While effective and predictable 
macroeconomic policy probably attracts the multinational firms, employing inflation as its measure 
is problematic for a variety of reasons, even though the researchers in question agree that it is 
indeed a “rough” measure. 
When it comes to inflation’s association with FDI, the research literature is torn. On one hand, when 
studying bilateral FDI flows, Frenkel et al. (2004, p. 297) did not find inflation to be attracting force 
for FDI. On the other hand, inflation is used often as a control variable in similar studies, as is the 
case with Krifa-Schneider and Matei (2010, p. 58) who found out that inflation is a statistically 
significant determinant of FDI in a panel study on political risk. 
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In the regression model there was also a dummy variable to control regional characteristics as the 
fifth variable. The regional characteristics are based on the World Bank’s 2005 classification of 
regions and they are used in the regression because some regions are likely to weigh on the 
investment decision. The sixth variable was one of the twelve indicators for political risk, denoted 
as POLITICAL. The political risk indicators were added on regression one at a time to avoid 
multicollinearity. 
The regression was thus: 
log FDIi = β0 + β1 log GNIi + β2 GROWTHi + β3 log TRADEi + β4 log INFLATIONi + β5 log REGIONALi + β6 
POLITICALi + ei. 
Busse and Hefeker found out that GNI, GROWTH and TRADE all had positive and statistically 
significant coefficient at least at the 5 percent level influence on FDI. INFLATION had also positive 
relation yet insignificant. 
More interesting however, is that while the estimated coefficients of the political risk indicators 
were each positive, only four were statistically significant at the 10 percent level except the one for 
the bureaucracy quality which was significant at the 5 percent level. The other three were 
democratic accountability, government stability and law and order. According to earlier research, 
all these variables except government stability were found to be associated with FDI (Busse and 
Hefeker, 2005, pp. 10). Busse and Hefeker discuss this and ponder whether the time framing of this 
approach might lead to such rather insignificant results. After all, looking at the average of all 
variables between the years 1984 and 2003 will leave out different events that have happened 
during that period. They bring up Brazil which around 1990 had high inflation that lowered by the 
end of the decade to levels more akin to those of the developed world. The same problem with the 
time period could be present with some of the political risks. Thus, they moved on to use a cross-
section time-series analysis. 
For the country fixed-effects time-series model Busse and Hefeker add five 4-year averages 
spanning the years 1983 to 2003. They speculate that for small developing economies which were 
numerous in their data, the FDI flows vary greatly from year to year and thus the benchmark 
regression gave fallacious results. By adding the 4-year time periods they could get more specific 
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results for more specific time periods. Also, logarithmic FDI can give misleading results when the 
flows are negative. 
The regression model Busse and Hefeker came up with was similar to the one before: 
log FDIit = β0 + β1 log GNIit + β2 GROWTHit + β3 log TRADEit + β4 log INFLATIONit + β5 POLITICALit + eit. 
They left out regional dummies and each variable was not only for a country but also for a period t. 
This time each of the control variables was both positive and significant and for the political variables 
only corruption, military influence in politics, and religious tensions were not significantly associated 
with FDI. Busse and Hefeker noted that stronger socio-economic conditions were adversely 
associated with FDI. They conclude that this has more to do with country-specific factors as they 
vary greatly from country to country and that its sub-variables that form the variable in question 
are unlikely to affect FDI flows. Out of the remaining significant indicators government stability, 
investment profile, law and order and democratic accountability had the largest coefficients. Apart 
from the investment profile they were also the significant ones in the earlier regression. 
When it comes to Turkey, this democratic accountability is one indicator that has likely deteriorated 
in recent years. These results of Busse and Hefeker imply that FDI flows might be lower for Turkey 
because of a possible decline in political liberties. Also, earlier literature supports this claim (Busse, 
2004; Jensen, 2003). Busse and Hefeker also found out that higher ethnic tensions tend to scare 
away the investments. Turkey has had ethnic tensions with its largest minority, the Kurds, and they 
have been increasing since the July 2016 coup attempt (see the report by Council on Foreign 
Relations). This might also affect possible ethnic tension rating as well as FDI flows due to increased 
instability. 
This fixed-effects model has some drawbacks. Out of simplicity Busse and Hefeker had to assume 
that all the variables were exogenous, even though some variables such as trade openness are 
clearly affected by FDI flows. The researchers also worried about the autocorrelation of the error 
terms and the Durbin-Watson d statistic indicates this at the positive first-order level with a value 
of 1.37. They sought to correct these problems by adding the Arellano and Bond (1991) generalized 
method of moments estimator (GMM). This way, the endogeneity problem could be solved by using 
lagged levels of differenced explanatory variables as instruments for estimating the model with the 
method of Arellano and Bond (1991). Also, the autocorrelated error term would be addressed with 
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the lagged dependent variable. This meant that the specification was changed into a dynamic panel 
model. Busse and Hefeker noted that the earlier investment flows may affect the investment 
decisions of multinational corporations at the current period so theoretically this should be a sound 
method. 
The model with the GMM estimator is built so that it is no longer a fixed-effects model. The equation 
Busse and Hefeker produced was 
Δlog FDIit = β0 + β1 Δlog FDIit-1 + β2 Δlog GNIit + β3 ΔGROWTHit + β4 Δlog ΔTRADEit + β5 Δlog INFLATIONit 
+ β6 ΔPOLITICALit + Δeit. 
According to the Sargan test, the instrument was appropriate for use, and according to the 
regression statistics no autocorrelation at the second-order level was found. Thus, the assumptions 
behind the GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991) were met. By using this equation it was discovered 
that FDI of the earlier period is the leading control variable as GNI and INFLATION become 
insignificant and others are only significant at the higher 10 percent level. For the political risks this 
dynamic panel analysis shows that all have expected sign and significant indicators are government 
stability, investment profile, internal conflict, law and order, ethnic tensions, and democratic 
accountability. 
All in all, the 2005 paper of Busse and Hefeker concludes that in each of their models and among 
the twelve indicators of political risk, corruption, military in politics and religious tensions were ones 
that they could not statistically link to FDI, and the effects of socio-economic conditions remained 
negligible. The strongest indicators were law and order and government stability. 
  




Most of the research data of this study are from the World Bank and was downloaded via 
theglobaleconomy.org. The research requires 1996-2017 data of foreign direct investment to 
Turkey, real GDP in per-capita terms, growth rate, and trade openness. The latter three are used as 
control variables as all of them were linked to FDI in some way. The data for these variables are from 
the World Bank. 
There are also nine indicators that each measure some aspect of governance or political 
management of a country. The changes in these indicators over time imply an increase or a decrease 
in political risks. The World Bank also provided the bulk of the indicators used for this piece of 
research. These are called the Worldwide Governance Indicators and there are six of them: 
Regulatory Quality, Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Control of 
Corruption, and Political Stability. American research institute Freedom House provides two 
indicators, Political Rights and Civil Liberties. From Transparency International there is one indicator, 
the Corruption Perceptions Index. 
Foreign direct investment is the dependent variable in this study and the net inflow of investment 
is measured as a percentage share of Turkey’s GDP in 2018 American dollars. Not all capital inflow 
is measured in this variable as some of it is other forms of investment such as the portfolio 
investment, for example. Foreign direct investment is a kind of investment that businesses in one 
country make into other countries. The business has to own at least a tenth of the voting stock in 
shares of the target business for its investment to be classified as FDI, according to the World Bank 
(see The World Bank’s DataBank on FDI). 
3.1 The Control Variables 
The size of an economy is an important determinant of FDI. The rationale is quite simple: the bigger 
the economy, the more profitable investments as there is more spendable wealth in the country. 
For this piece of research, the GDP per capita figure at purchasing power parity was used. Using the 
per-capita figures gives a rough picture of the average income of the country’s residents. From the 
multinationals’ point of view, the higher GDP per capita implies more high-income consumers and 
thus, a more lucrative market. Estimating at the purchasing power parity gives a more accurate 
picture of the standard of living than measuring in nominal values as PPP figures are cleaned from 
any transaction costs that skew the numbers. The figures are in 2011 international US dollars. Figure 
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1 depicts the per-capita size of the economy and the dependent variable of the study, the share of 
the net FDI inflow of the GDP. 
FIGURE 1: THE SHARE OF NET FDI INFLOW OF GDP AND GDP PER CAPITA AT THE PURCHASING POWER PARITY 
OVER TIME 
 
The economy’s growth rate is often considered to be a variable that is positively related to FDI 
(Chakrabarti, 2001). This makes sense as if the size of the economy is almost always considered to 
be the most important determinant, then the growth rate of the economy should carry some weight 
as well. One could say that growth figures capture expectations about the future economy. The GDP 
growth rate is stated simply as a percentage of the increase in the country’s GDP. The data are in 
2010 US dollars. 
Trade openness is the share of the country’s exports and imports of the GDP in a given year. The 
idea behind this variable is that the openness of an economy manifests in the trade that has already 
been realized, that is, exports and imports. Like GDP per capita and GDP growth rate, Busse and 
Hefeker (2005) chose openness to trade to be their third control variable, and according to 
Chakrabarti (2001), trade openness is deemed to have either positive or insignificant relation to FDI. 
The GDP growth and the trade openness in the years 1996-2017 can be seen in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2: THE GDP GROWTH AND THE TRADE OPENNESS OVER TIME 
 
Each mentioned control variable above is expected to be positively correlated with the FDI. There is 
probably also some endogeneity bias in the control variables. For example, GDP growth might be 
caused by a variable that is not present in the model that also affects the error term, i.e. the omitted-
variable bias. 
Two additional control variables will be tested to determine whether they will make the model 
specification better. The first of these is the inflation that was also used by Busse and Hefeker (2005) 
in their study. It is usually measured as a percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 
will also be used as such in this paper. Busse and Hefeker interpreted it as an indicator for 
macroeconomic performance while also conceding that it is a vague measure for it. Inflation is a 
variable that is likely to be negatively correlated with FDI as high inflation rapidly diminishes the 
value of investments over time, lowering the desire for investing in high inflation countries.  
The second additional control variable is the dollar exchange rate. The figures are the exchange 
rates in the given year. The rationale is that a weaker currency does not attract capital as much as a 
strong currency does. Also, the American dollar is widely used for international transactions so the 
dollar exchange rate may hold some explanatory power over foreign direct investment. The 
exchange rate is likely negatively correlated with FDI, as in the earlier literature it has had either 
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negative or insignificant significance on FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001). Both the exchange rate and the 
inflation exclude each other in the specifications because of two reasons: firstly, both would likely 
affect each other a great deal, and secondly, the number of control variables would be quite high 
even if only one were in the specification. 
In Figure 3 there are depicted the time series of the GDP growth percentage and the Turkish inflation 
rate. The simultaneous high inflation and the low exchange rate in the late 90s to the early 2000s 
are linked to the crawling peg exchange regime of the time (Görmez and Yılmaz, 2007). 
FIGURE 3: THE DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE OF THE TURKISH LIRA AND THE INFLATION RATE OVER TIME 
 
 
3.2 The Political Indicators 
Some of the political indicators are overlapping with each other to a degree, especially the ones that 
are from different sources. For instance, the Civil Liberties index by Freedom House tries to capture 
measures of the rule of law, freedom of expression, and association rights (Freedom House’s 
website), all of which are also covered by some of the World Bank’s Governance Indicators such as 
the Rule of Law index or the Voice and Accountability index. This is not a problem. In fact, to a 
degree, similar results from the regressions of two variables that try to depict the same concepts 
bolster the validity of both indicators. These indicators are the following: 
Changes in Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey during the 1996-2017 due to Political Risk 
18 
 
• Freedom House’s Political Rights index, denoted as PR, depicts the electoral process, 
pluralism, participation, and country’s governments’ functioning. It takes values between 1 
and 7, with 1 indicating strong political rights and 7 weak. 
• The other indicator by Freedom House, the Civil Liberties index, CL, vies to capture the 
measures for free speech, the rule of law, personal liberty and the freedom of assembly. Like 
Political Rights index, it takes values between 1 for strong liberties and 7 for weak. 
• Transparency International provides Corruptions Perceptions index, Corruption. It aims to 
measure perceived corruption in the public sector by combining information from a variety 
of independent sources. It takes values between 0 and 100, 100 being no corruption of any 
kind in the public sector. 
• The World Bank’s Control of Corruption index, Controlcorruption, tries to provide a picture 
similar to the Corruptions Perceptions index. Notions like how the public sector is used for 
rent-seeking and other forms of misuse are the focus of this index. It takes values between 
-2.50 to 2.50, the higher the value the stronger the institutions. 
• The World Bank’s Government Effectiveness index, GE, focuses on the quality of public policy 
and its implementation. The valuation is between -2.50 and 2.50. 
• The World Bank’s Political Stability index, PS, measures the absence of violence, terrorism, 
and other kinds of coercion that might destabilize the government. This index takes values 
between -2.50 and 2.50. 
• The World Bank’s Regulatory Quality index, RQ, measures how the public sector can regulate 
the private sector with sound policies. The index takes values between -2.50 and 2.50. 
• The World Bank’s Rule of Law index, Rol, measures how much government’s subjects can 
trust it to dish out justice, i.e. uphold property rights and enforce contracts, and keep level 
playing field. Takes values between -2.50 and 2.50. 
• The World Bank’s Voice and Accountability index, Vaa, is about citizens’ ability to participate 
in the government’s decision-making process and the government’s responsibility to carry 
out that delegated will. The index takes values between -2.50 and 2.50. 
The indexes of Freedom House and Transparency International can be seen in Figure 4 and the 
Governance Indicators in Figure 5. It can be seen in both pictures that there is a modest 
downward trend in each indicator after around 2011. Most of the indexes also take lower values 
in the 90s and display an upward trend to their peaks around 2005 and 2006. The general outline 
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of the indicators supports the claim that there has been progress on democracy and other 
institutions around the turn of the millennium which has been reversed in the 2010s. 
FIGURE 4: THE INDEXES OF FREEDOM HOUSE AND THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX OVER TIME 
 
Notes: The left-hand scale for PR and CL is inverted due to the indicators’ inverted valuation. 
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FIGURE 5: THE WORLD BANK'S GOVERNANCE INDICATORS OVER TIME 
 
The data for the World Bank’s Governance Indicators were collected annually except for the early 
years when data collection and publishing proceeded every other year. Kauffman et al. (2003, p.4) 
used data of the two years to form values for even-numbered years 1998, 2000, and 2002. This is 
the reason for using the value of the next year for years 1997, 1999, and 2001. 
The overlap of the political indicators with each other can be seen in the correlation matrix, in Table 
1 below. Variables PR and CL are negatively correlated with other political variables and are 
positively correlated with each other because for them the lower values imply stronger institutions 
while the rest of the indicators work the other way around. Variables targeting corruption, 
Controlcorruption and Corruption, correlate reasonably well with each other at 0.70. RQ has a 
relatively low correlation with every other variable across the board. Curiously, PS and Corruption 
as well as Vaa and RQ have a negative correlation with each other. No variable beyond these seem 
to have an unexpected correlation with any other indicator. Despite this, the political indicators can 
be expected to be positively correlated with FDI except PR and CL which should be negatively 
correlated with the political variables. 
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PR 1         
CL 0.89 1        
Corruption -0.37 -0.29 1       
RQ -0.02 -0.01 0.39 1      
Vaa -0.68 -0.76 0.05 -0.23 1     
Rol -0.70 -0.74 0.06 0.14 0.80 1    
GE -0.73 -0.62 0.81 0.11 0.46 0.39 1   
Controlcorruption -0.56 -0.64 0.70 0.34 0.43 0.43 0.67 1  
PS -0.41 -0.51 -0.27 0.01 0.76 0.78 0.11 0.07 1 
Notes: The correlation values are calculated from the averages of the research period 1996–2017. 
One noteworthy point about the data is the small number of observations as only a single country 
is subject to study, and the annual data cover the years from 1996 to 2017. That means 22 
observations per variable. This means that empirical methods used need be as robust as they can 
be. 
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4 Empirical Results 
In this section the method, the model and results are addressed. The method used to conduct the 
study resembles that of Busse and Hefeker (2005) except that instead of a panel study, I chose linear 
time series regression as only one country is studied, Turkey. Like Busse and Hefeker however, the 
regression is run separately for each different political indicator to avoid multicollinearity. The 
change in the different indexes is interpreted as a change in the risk of the country which 
multinationals take into account when making investment decisions. 
While the method is quite simple, the model selection is rather detailed as Chakrabarti (2001) noted 
that in the earlier research the rationale for the control variables is often insufficient. Furthermore, 
the data that are utilized for this study are very limited with only 22 observations per variable. The 
limited dataset does not only necessitate even more rigorous justification for the model selection 
but it also highlights the need for proper and sound diagnostics that help get robust results. 
4.1 The Model Selection 
As discussed in the literature review section, there are some ways to construct a model for 
estimating the relationship of a variable with FDI. Also, the limited number of observations has to 
be taken into account when selecting the model. For instance, that there are not too many variables 
in the model that diminish the model usefulness. Market size, economic growth, and trade openness 
are often selected as the control variables in the literature focusing on FDI. As such the benchmark 
specification or the plain specification would be 
log FDIt = β0 + β1 log GDPt + β2 GROWTHt + β3 log TRADEt + β4 POLITICALt + et. 
In the equation, lower case t denotes the time period of the observation and the FDIt is the 
dependent variable, the foreign direct investment as a share of net capital inflow of GDP to the 
country in a given year. Next, β0 is the intercept, and GDPt refers to GDP per capita at the purchasing 
power parity. GROWTHt stands for economic growth as a percentage of GDP, and TRADEt is the 
openness to trade. POLITICALt is one of the variables for the political indicators presented above. All 
political indicators are not added into the specification at once to avoid both multicollinearity and 
overly long model. Finally, for the error term there is et. Like the earlier studies of this field (Busse 
and Hefeker 2005, p. 9), a natural logarithm is taken of each variable except GROWTHt and 
POLITICALt. GROWTHt has some negative values that might affect adversely to results if the 
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logarithm is used, so the GROWTHt is left plain. In their study, Busse and Hefeker left their growth 
variable unlogarithmized for the same reason as well. 
Whether to use either inflation or USD exchange rate as an additional control variable or to forgo 
the fourth control variable was given a lot of thought. Stable and low inflation implies less risk and 
better macroeconomic policy, both of which make the business environment better and invite 
foreign capital. A strong exchange rate against the dollar indicates that the returns are higher with 
the invested capital, attracting foreign corporations. However, adding either of these additional 
control variables would make the model more complex and possibly erode its explanatory power. 
To gain insight into these additional control variables for the regression, it is good to see how they 
correlate with the political variables. Table 2 gives the specifics. When looking at the numbers, it 
has to be taken into account that PR and CL are valued in the reverse order, so that positive 
correlation means that the concepts are inversely correlated and vice versa. For the exchange rate 
there is quite a range in both signs and correlation coefficient magnitude. Four political variables 
are negatively correlated (PR and CL not taken into account) with the exchange rate while the rest 
are positive, and the absolute values range from 0.13 to 0.55. With the inflation the correlation is 
much clearer, since only RQ and PS are positively correlated with it and their coefficients are 
relatively small, 0.15 and 0.03, respectively. The coefficients of inversely correlated variables range 
from 0.34 to 0.80 in their absolute value so the relationship is relatively strong between these 
variables. 
TABLE 2: THE CORRELATION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE AND THE INFLATION WITH THE POLITICAL INDICATORS 
 Exchange rate Inflation 
PR -0.26 0.74 
CL -0.13 0.71 
Corruption 0.44 -0.58 
RQ -0.31 0.15 
Vaa -0.24 -0.38 
Rol -0.29 -0.34 
GE 0.49 -0.80 
Controlcorruption 0.15 -0.62 
PS -0.55 0.03 
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The takeaway here is that inflation probably depicts a similar phenomenon as the most political 
indicators do. It might be problematic to put it into the specification since inflation might contain 
much of the same information as the political variables. The exchange rate on the other hand, is not 
problematic in this regard. However, the inconsistency is unnerving. 
To select the most accurate specification, Akaike and Bayesian information criteria will be used to 
compare the models. These information criteria will point which specifications lose more 
information due to their specification than others, and thus they are useful tools for the model 
selection. 
To use the information criteria, the models have to be formed. Let the inflation specification be 
log FDIt = β0 + β1 log GDPt + β2 GROWTHt + β3 log TRADEt + β4 log INFLATIONt + β5 POLITICALt + et, 
and the exchange rate specification be 
log FDIt = β0 + β1 log GDPt + β2 GROWTHt + β3 log TRADEt + β4 log EXRATEt + β5 POLITICALt + et. 
Naturally, INFLATIONt and EXRATEt stand for the inflation rate and the dollar exchange rate, 
respectively. A logarithm is taken of the additional control variable in both specifications. Otherwise 
these specifications are the same as the plain specification. 
It has to be emphasized that there is a very limited dataset in use which means that avoiding 
overfitting the model. Turkey is a single country with its own characteristics. This is why even a 
simpler model with fewer control variables than three might also be a good choice, at least for 
comparison. Earlier literature (Chakrabarti, 2001) even suggested that only market size per capita 
was the only truly conclusive determinant of FDI. That is why the fourth specification is picked in 
which there is only GDPt as the sole control variable. The stub specification is as follows: 
log FDIt = β0 + β1 log GDPt + β2 POLITICALt + et. 
In Table 3 can be seen the information criteria results. The lower the scores, the less information is 
lost due to the model specification. While several models give lower scores in the other 
specifications, such as CL and Vaa in the plain specification, the inflation specification scores the 
lowest average scores of all models in both AIC and BIC. The average scores are 35.42 in AIC and 
43.06 in BIC. For the other specifications, the results are not as clear-cut. 
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TABLE 3: THE AKAIKE AND BAYESIAN INFORMATION CRITERIA RESULTS 
The specification The plain The exchange rate The inflation The stub 
The political indicators AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
PR 40.30 46.84 42.02 49.66 36.85 44.49 41.26 45.62 
CL 31.52 38.07 33.40 41.04 33.52 41.16 35.53 39.89 
Corruption 47.69 54.23 45.29 52.93 36.81 44.45 45.72 50.09 
RQ 48.34 54.89 45.96 53.60 36.39 44.03 46.79 51.15 
Vaa 33.57 40.11 35.39 43.03 34.91 42.54 35.73 40.10 
Rol 40.83 47.38 42.22 49.86 36.70 44.34 42.13 46.50 
GE 41.99 48.53 42.97 50.61 36.61 44.24 40.19 44.56 
Controlcorruption 42.74 49.29 37.85 45.48 36.45 44.09 43.28 47.64 
PS 30.80 37.35 32.77 40.41 30.55 38.18 35.41 39.78 
 
If the average information criteria scores between all models are examined, the exchange rate 
specification is likely to be the most information losing specification among the four. It scores 39.76 
in AIC which is the third-highest score among all specifications, and 47.40 in BIC which is the highest 
score. Moreover, the earlier literature indicated that it has an inconclusive relationship with FDI 
(Chakrabarti, 2001). For these reasons, the exchange rate specification is not analyzed in this study. 
The stub specification’s average scores are 40.67 in AIC and 45.04 in BIC. Its average AIC score is the 
highest. However, the plain specification scores 39.75 and 46.30 on average in AIC and BIC, 
respectively. So the stub specification’s average AIC is not far behind with the difference of 0.92 in 
the scores. With the low number of observations in the data it might be a good idea to have a 
specification that is unlikely to be overfitted for comparison. Also, it can be tested later if the control 
variables that the plain specification contains but the stub specification lacks, are excessive.  
It was decided to study the results of the three specifications: the plain, the inflation, and the stub.  
The literature review above makes it clear that there are many determinants for FDI. Many variables 
affect it but there is no coherent theory on FDI’s determining variables. Also, the data do not have 
many observations. As such the best way to approach the truth is to look at many methods and 
models and see where they point, even though the methods chosen for this study are limited to a 
literature review and a time series regression analysis. The research questions of this study can be 
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best answered looking at the wider picture and that is why comparing estimates given by multiple 
models works better than choosing only one. 
4.2 The Results 
The regression results of the plain specification can be seen in Table 4. We can see that all the 
political indicators in the plain specification models have the expected sign (negative for PR and CL 
because of inverted scoring, positive for the rest) except RQ. All coefficients of the political 
indicators except for those of RQ, Corruption, and Controlcorruption are significant at the 5 percent 
level and Controlcorruption is significant at the 10 percent level. Statistical significance and sign in 
the coefficients of the control variables alternate strongly between variables and models. GDP is 
positive in all and significant in every model at least at the 10 percent level while intercept is 
negative and significant at least at the 5 percent level in every model.  
Interestingly, GROWTH shows a negative sign in every regression while TRADE is positive in each. 
GROWTH is possibly negative because FDI figure used here describes the share of net FDI inflow of 
GDP. Higher growth may not translate into an increased GDP share of net FDI inflows. The 
coefficients of GROWTH and TRADE are both significant in five out of nine models at least at the 10 
percent level. GROWTH is notably significant at the 0.1 percent level in PR and the 5 percent in PS, 
while TRADE is significant at the 5 percent level in RQ. Otherwise, the control variables except GDP 
do not seem to be important in determining the FDI, with almost half of the models containing 
insignificant coefficients. 
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TABLE 4: THE REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE PLAIN SPECIFICATION 























































































































































































































































































R2 0.63 0.75 0.49 0.47 0.73 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.76 
No. of obs. 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Notes: Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are based on Andrews’s (1991) correction for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, see section 4.3 for more details; ‘***' significant at the 0.1 
percent level; '**' significant at the 1 percent level; '*' significant at the 5 percent level; '.' significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
The regression results are shown in Table 5 for the stub specification. The sign is expected for all 
political indicators except for RQ, and all are significant at least at the 10 percent level except RQ 
and Controlcorruption.  GDP is positive in each one and significant at least at the 5 percent level 
whereas intercepts are negative and significant at least at the 5 percent level in every model. For 
the coefficients of the political indicators, all except those of RQ and Controlcorruption are 
significant at least at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 5: THE REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE STUB SPECIFICATION 
















































































































































































































































R^2 0.54 0.65 0.44 0.40 0.64 0.52 0.56 0.50 0.65 
No. of obs. 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Notes: Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are based on Andrews’s (1991) correction for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, see section 4.3 for more details; ‘***’ significant at the 0.1 
percent level; '**' significant at the 1 percent level; '*' significant at the 5 percent level; '.' significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
No model with the inflation specification gives any significance even at the 10 percent level to any 
political indicator as can be seen in Table 6. Of the political indicators, only Rol does not have the 
expected sign. The intercepts and GROWTH have negative signs while TRADE has positive signs in 
every model. Curiously, GDP has the expected sign only in Vaa, PR, and PS. The intercepts besides 
CL are insignificant in every model. The coefficient of GROWTH is significant only in CL at the 10 
percent level and in PS at the 5 percent level while TRADE is significant at the 5 percent level in every 
model except CL in which it is significant at the 10 percent level. INFLATION is significant at least at 
the 10 percent level in every model except CL, Vaa, and PS models. The sign of INFLATION is negative 
as expected in every model. 
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TABLE 6: THE REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE INFLATION SPECIFICATION 






























































































































































































































































2.53 *  
(1.11) 










































R2 0.71 0.75 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.79 
No. of obs. 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Notes: Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are based on Andrews’s (1991) correction for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, see section 4.3 for more details; ‘***’ significant at the 0.1 
percent level; '**' significant at the 1 percent level; '*' significant at the 5 percent level; '.' significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
4.3 Robustness and Diagnostics 
To check whether or not the error terms of the models are autocorrelated, the Breusch-Godfrey 
test is employed on the regressions. Its null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation up to the 
specified order. As such there is a tendency that a lower order of lags results in lower values, 
supposedly indicating an increased likelihood of autocorrelation. Due to a small sample size only a 
limited number of lags can be reasonably used in the test. In this piece of research, five lags are 
considered to be the highest order of lags in the test results to be examined. In the interpretation 
of the results, more weight will be put on the higher order of lags, like four and five, than lower, 
such as one and two. Also, it has to be noted that since the models used are predictive, some 
autocorrelation can be expected.  
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Looking at the test results in Table 7, all the political indicators in the plain specification uphold the 
null hypothesis at the 5 percent significance level with five lags. However, if the results are examined 
at every order of lags, the error terms of certain models seem to be surely less likely to be 
autocorrelated while some other indicators are more likely to be serially correlated. PS, for example, 
gets relatively high p-values across the board while Corruption and RQ both maintain the null 
hypothesis only at the fifth order of lags, which casts doubt on their supposed lack of 
autocorrelation. Only five indicators uphold the null hypothesis at the third order of lags: PR, Vaa, 
GE, Controlcorruption, and PS. 
TABLE 7: THE BREUSCH-GODFREY TEST RESULTS FOR THE PLAIN SPECIFICATION 
 P-value 
The order of lags 1 2 3 4 5 
PR 0.045 0.067 0.118 0.205 0.239 
CL 0.220 0.158 0.031 0.048 0.065 
Corruption 0.003 0.011 0.028 0.048 0.088 
RQ 0.002 0.007 0.020 0.039 0.072 
Vaa 0.108 0.042 0.096 0.164 0.257 
Rol 0.020 0.012 0.028 0.056 0.099 
GE 0.016 0.050 0.112 0.189 0.293 
Controlcorruption 0.021 0.039 0.068 0.128 0.207 
PS 0.437 0.470 0.678 0.786 0.837 
 
In general, the p-values are higher with each additional order of lags, with the exception of CL, as 
can be seen in Table 7. The case of CL in the Breusch-Godfrey test for the plain specification is a 
curious one. When looking at lag orders at ascending order, CL is at its highest at the first-order, 
then drops to its lowest value at the order three, then rises a little, getting over the 5 percent 
significance at the order five. It could be that the index in question is autocorrelated at the range of 
three last years, thus explaining why the third-order gives the lowest value. 
When checking for autocorrelation with the Breusch-Godfrey test, results indicate that there is 
unlikely to be remarkable autocorrelation. As can be seen in Table 8, at the fourth and fifth orders 
of lags no indicator is below the 10 percent level in significance, and at three lags there is CL and at 
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two there are Corruption and RQ that are below the 10 percent level. At the first-order Corruption, 
RQ, and GE are below the 0.1 level. Otherwise, there are no traces of autocorrelation.   
TABLE 8: THE BREUSCH-GODFREY TEST RESULTS FOR THE STUB SPECIFICATION 
 P-value 
The order of lags 1 2 3 4 5 
PR 0.266 0.492 0.449 0.607 0.734 
CL 0.751 0.616 0.081 0.112 0.182 
Corruption 0.018 0.059 0.128 0.166 0.250 
RQ 0.016 0.055 0.116 0.158 0.251 
Vaa 0.478 0.236 0.318 0.471 0.491 
Rol 0.107 0.114 0.166 0.275 0.391 
GE 0.084 0.214 0.379 0.544 0.650 
Controlcorruption 0.129 0.258 0.438 0.501 0.645 
PS 0.643 0.502 0.661 0.809 0.901 
 
With the inflation specification almost every political indicator upholds the null hypothesis at the 5 
percent level of significance in the Breusch-Godfrey test at every order of lags as can be seen in 
Table 9. Only CL at the orders three and four as well as Vaa at the second-order are below 0.05. 
Otherwise the inflation specification seems not to be autocorrelated. 
TABLE 9: THE BREUSCH-GODFREY TEST RESULTS FOR THE INFLATION SPECIFICATION 
 P-value 
The order of lags 1 2 3 4 5 
PR 0.109 0.074 0.056 0.103 0.149 
CL 0.185 0.148 0.030 0.047 0.062 
Corruption 0.117 0.068 0.059 0.109 0.169 
RQ 0.143 0.121 0.077 0.137 0.171 
Vaa 0.097 0.036 0.070 0.124 0.203 
Rol 0.145 0.096 0.069 0.116 0.163 
GE 0.106 0.081 0.077 0.140 0.196 
Controlcorruption 0.136 0.057 0.063 0.112 0.177 
PS 0.324 0.209 0.200 0.309 0.349 




To find traces of possible heteroskedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan test is used. The Breusch-Pagan test 
tests conditional heteroskedasticity with the null hypothesis being that there is no 
heteroskedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test assumes that there would be linear heteroskedasticity. 
As such it does not take nonlinear heteroskedasticity into account. 
According to the Breusch-Pagan test, there seems to be little to no linear heteroskedasticity as can 
be seen in Table 10. No value in the plain or stub specification is below 5 percent level and in the 
inflation specification only value below 5 percent level threshold is Rol. In the inflation specification 
the p-values seem to be generally lower than in the plain or the stub specification. All in all, the 
possibility of linear heteroskedasticity can be eliminated from all indicators except from the inflation 
specification Rol. This does not mean however, that there would not be heteroskedasticity at all.  
TABLE 10: THE BREUSCH-PAGAN TEST RESULTS FOR THE PLAIN, INFLATION AND STUB SPECIFICATIONS 
 The plain specification The inflation specification The stub specification 
 BP df p-value BP df p-value BP df p-value 
PR 3.75 4 0.44 9.48 5 0.09 2.36 2 0.31 
CL 8.94 4 0.06 10.05 5 0.07 2.42 2 0.30 
Corruption 0.72 4 0.95 10.24 5 0.07 1.10 2 0.58 
RQ 0.41 4 0.98 9.49 5 0.09 0.70 2 0.71 
Vaa 4.09 4 0.39 6.77 5 0.24 4.00 2 0.14 
Rol 1.34 4 0.85 11.88 5 0.04 1.67 2 0.43 
GE 1.00 4 0.91 9.34 5 0.10 1.81 2 0.40 
Controlcorruption 3.18 4 0.53 9.75 5 0.08 3.62 2 0.16 
PS 3.29 4 0.51 5.24 5 0.39 2.46 2 0.29 
 
To be sure that neither heteroskedasticity nor autocorrelation does not compromise the 
interpretation of the results, it was decided to use standard errors that are both heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) in the regression. This way there is little doubt about the 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. These standard errors were computed using R with the 
sandwich package that provides the function vcovHAC that was used with default settings (Zeileis 
2004). The method is presented by Andrews (1991) and it involves a Quadratic Spectral kernel and 
the bandwidth selection that happens automatically using an AR(1) approximation. The small 
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sample size is indeed something that must be taken into account when tampering with the standard 
errors but the effect of the HAC standard errors on the results should not be too distorting. 
To be sure that the HAC standard errors do not distort the results too much, the regression results 
of the plain and the specification without the modified standard errors can be seen in Table 11 and 
Table 12, respectively. As can be seen in the tables, the significance of the coefficients remains 
largely the same in both specifications with some exceptions. For example, in the plain specification, 
CL, Vaa, and PS are significant at the 0.1 percent level instead of 1 percent, and Controlcorruption 
is significant at the 5 percent level instead of the 10 percent level. Meanwhile, in the stub 
specification, the normal standard errors make PR significant at the 5 percent level instead of the 
earlier 10 percent, and Corruption loses significance. Controlcorruption gains significance at the 10 
percent level with the normal standard errors. There were some other changes as well but these 
are the most notable. The most important differences are those that concern those indicators 
whose coefficients change significance past or to the 10 percent level, namely Corruption and 
Controlcorruption. These models should be approached with caution when analyzing. Otherwise, 
any changes in the level of significance do not matter in the interpretation, provided that the 
coefficient remains significant. 
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TABLE 11: THE REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE PLAIN SPECIFICATION WITH DEFAULT STANDARD ERRORS 























































































































































































































































































R2 0.63 0.75 0.49 0.47 0.73 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.76 
No. of obs. 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Notes: ‘***' significant at 0.1 percent level; '**' significant at 1 percent level; '*' significant at 5 
percent level; '.' significant at 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 12: THE REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE STUB SPECIFICATION WITH DEFAULT STANDARD ERRORS 
















































































































































































































































R^2 0.54 0.65 0.44 0.40 0.64 0.52 0.56 0.50 0.65 
No. of obs. 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Notes: ‘***’ significant at 0.1 percent level; '**' significant at 1 percent level; '*' significant at 5 
percent level; '.' significant at 10 percent level. 
4.4 Interpretation 
To start with, I reject the inflation specification as the specification to examine in this study. The 
problem with the inflation specification is that it cannot be said much about FDI’s connection to the 
control variables or the political variables with its results. No coefficient of the political variables is 
statistically significant in that specification. Out of the control variables, however, INFLATION is 
significant in six models out of nine. It is possible that the inflation figures contain most of the 
relevant information since in the models of the plain and the stub specification many control 
variables and political indicators are significant. Also, many variables correlated reasonably well with 
inflation as can be seen in Table 2 which bolsters this conclusion. In evaluating FDI with this dataset, 
inflation does not seem to be a useful control variable because of this. To gain insight into the 
political variables’ relationship with FDI with this dataset, one should rather focus on the inflation-
excluding models. 
When comparing the two remaining specifications, the results are quite consistent in both the plain 
and the stub specification. All political indicators except RQ have the expected sign in both 
specifications. The coefficients are of similar magnitude between the plain and the stub 
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specification, with the largest difference in coefficient size being in Rol that has 0.42 differential. 
The absolute values of the coefficients of the political variables are in the same order of magnitude 
in both specifications. RQ is not significant in either of the specifications. The most remarkable 
difference between the specifications is that Corruption is not significant in the plain specification 
while it is significant in the stub at the 10 percent level, and Controlcorruption is not significant in 
the stub specification while it is significant in the plain at the 10 percent level. Every other political 
indicator besides RQ, Corruption, and Controlcorruption is significant in both specifications at least 
at the 10 percent level. 
However, the results are not identical and that makes further comparison tricky. It would help out, 
if it could be concluded which specification is better for each model. The stub specification omits 
two of the control variables mainly due to a small amount of data, but the underwhelming 
significance of these control variables in the plain specification indicates that there is also merit to 
the stub specification due to its composition. To put it short, those control variables might be 
excessive. There are six models in which a coefficient of at least one variable is not significant even 
at the 10 percent level. For these models, it would be beneficial to test whether or not the 
insignificant variables could be dropped off from the plain specification. If yes, this would bolster 
the reasoning of the stub specification over the plain specification in this study. 
To check whether GROWTH and TRADE are jointly significantly different from zero, i.e. that they 
could be reliably removed from the model without making the model more inaccurate, an F-test is 
conducted on the coefficients of the variables that are deemed insignificant in the plain 
specification. The null hypothesis is that the control variables that were not significant at least at 
the 10 percent level are equal to zero. The level of significance for the F-test is considered to be at 
the 10 percent due to the small dataset. Six models have variables whose coefficients are not 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
As can be seen in Table 13, the results from the F-test indicate that two out of six plain specification 
models likely have their coefficients of the control variables equal to something else than zero. This 
would mean that the control variables in those models should not be removed and there is no need 
to try a shorter specification for them. However, four models – Corruption, RQ, GE, and 
Controlcorruption – scored higher than 0.1 in the F-test so for them, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. 
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TABLE 13: THE F-TEST RESULTS OF THE INSIGNIFICANT CONTROL VARIABLES OF THE PLAIN SPECIFICATION 
The plain specification F-test statistics  
Variable/statistic The hypothesis Res. Df Df F Pr(>F) 
PR β3 = 0 17 1 3.19 0.08 . 
CL β2 = 0 17 1 3.19 0.08 . 
Corruption β2 = β3 = β4 = 0 17 3 1.04 0.28 
RQ β4 = 0 17 1 0.02 0.89 
GE β2 = β3 = 0 17 2 1.52 0.25 
Controlcorruption β2 = β3 = 0 17 2 1.67 0.22 
Notes: Significance codes: ‘***’ significant at 0.1 percent level; ‘**’ significant at 1 percent level; 
‘*’ significant at 5 percent level; ‘.’ significant at 10 percent level. 
I do not reject plain specification, however. The earlier literature deemed that growth rate and trade 
openness hold some explanatory power over FDI. For the variables for which the F-test rejected the 
null hypothesis – Corruption, RQ, GE, and Controlcorruption – it would be fitting to weigh the stub 
specification more in analysis while for the others the plain specification’s results should carry more 
weight. Moreover, the information criteria scores for Corruption, RQ, and GE are lower for the stub 
specification, indicating less information loss. However, both information criteria results of 
Controlcorruption are lower for the plain specification than for the stub specification. For that 
model, the judgment should be based on an approach that takes both specifications equally into 
the account but otherwise I divide the analysis of the results into two based on the F-test results. 
Out of the models whose results are to be examined with the plain specification, the variable most 
associated with the FDI change appears to be Rol, Rule of Law. Its coefficient was 2.90 in the plain 
specification. This seems to bolster economists’ common argument that clearly defined property 
rights are important for economic activity since Rule of Law attempts to capture degree and 
coverage of the property rights enforcement. Busse and Hefeker (2005) also found out that their 
variables that describe similar areas of institutions, Investment Profile and Law and Order, were 
reasonably related to FDI as well across all their models.  
Continuing the analysis on the models for which the F-test does not suggest using the stub 
specification, another strongly associated variable is Vaa with its coefficient being 1.88. PS is 
moderately associated with a coefficient of 1.46. Interestingly, PS tries to capture the absence of 
violence in a state, and Busse and Hefeker (2005) found out that indicators targeting similar 
Changes in Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey during the 1996-2017 due to Political Risk 
38 
 
phenomena were remarkably relevant determinants of FDI. While PS is statistically significant at 
least at the 1 percent level, its coefficient is not the largest when comparing the World Bank 
indicators.  
The coefficients of PR and CL which were constructed by Freedom House might be lower than those 
of the significant World Bank variables because they worked on a bit different scale, from 7 to 1, 
instead of from -2.50 to 2.50. The coefficient of PR is significant at the 5 percent level while CL is 
significant at the 1 percent level in the plain specification. However, PR seems to hold more sway 
over FDI than CL with coefficients being -0.69 and -0.50, respectively. 
Of the models that are examined with the stub specification, GE has the highest coefficient of 2.02 
that is significant at the 1 percent level. It was also significant in the plain specification which adds 
certainty to the conclusion. The coefficient of RQ, on the other hand, is not significant in either stub 
or plain specification. It is also the only variable in both specifications that does not have the 
expected sign. Hence, it can be relatively safely concluded that RQ is not associated with FDI. The 
RQ index likely captures changes that are not associated with other indicators and that those 
changes are not likely related to FDI. The fact that RQ has a relatively low correlation with the other 
political indicators (Table 1) reinforces this conclusion. 
The indexes measuring corruption in the government, Corruption and Controlcorruption, are an 
interesting case. They have both insignificant coefficients depending on the specification that is 
examined. Also, they are the ones that were most affected by the choice of standard errors. 
Moreover, they have a reasonably high correlation of 0.70 (Table 1) with each other and both 
measure similar metrics according to their descriptions. These issues cast doubt on the viability of 
both models. I deem that the results of both models cannot be held conclusive as I believe it would 
be too bold to say anything about the relationship these models have with FDI. 
It is interesting to speculate on how to research this topic so that possible causality would be found. 
It is unknown how FDI flows affect political variables. If it were proven that the political indicators 
are independent of the FDI flows, it would carry this line of thought a long way. However, this could 
prove to be next to impossible. 
  




There has been extensive study of the FDI flows in the past. The aim of this paper is to contribute to 
this in two ways. Firstly, to look at whether there is an association between FDI flows and political 
risk using different indicators to look at many different areas of political risk. Secondly, to see the 
magnitude of these relationships between FDI and many political variables in Turkey in years 1996-
2017. To research these, a time-series regression was performed. The main difficulty of the study 
was the low number of observations which complicated model selection, diagnostics, and 
interpretation. 
In a setting of limited data, three models were selected. The first of them used real GDP per capita, 
GDP growth percentage, and trade openness as control variables and the second omitted the latter 
two control variables. The third one included the inflation as the fourth control variable along with 
growth rate and trade openness. The dollar exchange rate was considered for the fourth 
specification but that specification was discarded due to high information loss.  All of these variables 
had been used in the earlier FDI studies and market size, growth rate, and trade openness had been 
utilized often. Nine political indicators were inserted separately to the specifications to avoid 
multicollinearity.  
The specification including inflation yielded results that were underwhelming in their absence of 
statistical significance in the coefficients of the political variables. It is suspected that there is already 
internalized possible risk information in the inflation rate that was of interest in the political 
variables. A combination of information criteria and an F-test targeted at bolstering rationale for 
omitting two control variables were used to decide which of the specifications was better suited for 
analyzing the results of different models containing distinct political indicators. 
Out of the nine political indicators, the variable targeting Regulatory Quality is the only insignificant 
determinant of FDI in this study. The political variables that address corruption, the Corruption 
Perceptions Index and the Control of Corruption index, are deemed inconclusive due to inconsistent 
results between the specifications and the choice of standard errors. As such, no conclusion is made 
regarding their relationship with FDI in Turkey. Out of the World Bank indexes, the Rule of Law index 
has the highest coefficient of 2.90, indicating that it is most associated with the FDI. Out of the 
indexes of Freedom House, with the coefficient of -0.69 the Political Rights index is more associated 
with FDI than the Civil Liberties index. Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Voice and Accountability, Rule 
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of Law, Government Effectiveness, and Political Stability are all significant indexes related to net FDI 
inflows to Turkey. 
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics of Variables, 1996–2017 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
PR 22 336 0.48 3 4 
CL 22 4.00 0.85 3 5 
Corruption 22 39.25 5.50 31 35.4 
RQ 22* 0.27 0.14 0.04 0.5 
Vaa 22* −0.24 0.22 −0.71 −0.13 
Rol 22* 0.00 0.11 −0.25 −0.06 
GE 22* 0.13 0.19 −0.26 −0.08 
Controlcorruption 22* −0.12 0.19 −0.52 −0.15 
PS 22* −1.05 0.35 −2.01 −1.23 
FDI 22 1.38 0.92 0.31 0.42 
GDP 22 17432.95 3828.75 12842.36 13776.06 
GROWTH 22 4.92 4.47 −5.96 7.58 
TRADE 22 47.92 4.18 37.4 54.97 
EXRATE 22 1.48 0.87 0.08 0.15 
INFLATION 22 27.75 28.40 6.3 85.7 
Notes: The Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank were collected every other year 
during 1996–2002 so the actual number of observations is 19 for these indicators. For the purposes 
of this research the number is 22 as the value of the next year is used for years 1997, 1999, and 
2001. 
 
